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From ASPAC to EAS:
South Korea and the Asian Pacific Region
Brian Bridges1
Abstract
South Korea’s diplomatic and security focus has inevitably been on
North-east Asia and its difficult relationship with its northern
neighbour, but South Korea also has a role to play in the broader
Asian Pacific region. This paper analyses South Korea’s increasing
economic, political and cultural links with the region and its role in
the development of Asian Pacific regionalism. Utilising the concept
of ‘middle power’, it argues that, while clearly South Korea cannot
ignore what is happening in its immediate geographical environment,
it does have the economic and political resources to enable it to take
advantage of the opportunities for greater interactions with other
parts of the Asian Pacific region, if the political will exists.

South Korea’s relations with its northern neighbour and with the key
major powers interested in the Korean peninsula do represent an
important part of that country’s external relations, as the ‘missile
crisis’ from mid-June 2006 testifies. Yet they do not represent the
complete picture of South Korea’s external relations. This paper
endeavours to examine the development of South Korea’s role
within the broader Asian Pacific region. The starting point for this
paper comes from the autobiography of one South Korean foreign
minister, Lee Tong-won, who was responsible for, arguably, the
earliest Korean initiative towards the region, the Asia Pacific
Council (or ASPAC, as it generally became known). As he claimed,
‘for the first time in history, an international institution was founded
with Korea at the helm’; it was an organisation of 10 Asian and
1
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Australasian states trying to create a ‘peaceful revolution’ of Asians
gathering together in cooperation.2 Founded in 1966, ASPAC was all
but defunct by 1972, and it was to be several decades before South
Korea was again to be as active in pushing regional cooperation.
This does not mean that South Korea had nothing to do with the
Asian Pacific region, for the economic links became increasingly
stronger, but, at least until the late 1980s, any moves towards
promoting Asian ‘regionalism’, however tentative, came from other
parts of the Asian Pacific region.
The intense and enduring competition for political and diplomatic
legitimacy carried on between the North and the South during the
post-Korean War period found expression in the rivalry to enhance
their respective international status, not least through achieving
diplomatic recognition and membership of regional and international
organisations. Until the early 1970s, the South put ‘little effort’ into
developing its linkages with Third World countries, 3 but, after
abandoning its version of the West German ‘Hallstein doctrine’, the
South undoubtedly worked hard at diversifying its links away from
solely the United States and Japan, important though those two
partners remained. In this endeavour, the growing economic power
of South Korea, and the dilution of some of its anti-communist
rhetoric outside the immediate confines of policy towards the North,
undoubtedly helped. Indeed, in the 1980s ‘economic diplomacy and
diplomatic pragmatism’ became the ‘defining characteristics’ of
South Korea’s foreign policy and this trend was carried over into the
1990s as increasingly South Korea seemed to be winning the
diplomatic struggle with the North.4
In the 1990s, this pragmatic foreign policy approach began to find
expression in two new, but not totally compatible, ways. Firstly, in
2
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an aspiration to be recognised as an equal of the Western advanced
countries, including Japan, which was to find symbolic recognition
through South Korea’s admission to the OECD in 1996. Secondly, to
try to play a ‘bridging role’ between developed and developing
countries, both in international organisations such as the longrunning Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) negotiations and in setting up its own economic
cooperation fund for developing countries. However, the 1990s were
to show that the nearer South Korea came to joining the ‘top club’ of
the world’s economies, the more difficult it was to fulfil the second
role and during the Kim Young-sam administration the rhetoric of
the ‘mediating’ or ‘bridging’ role all but disappeared. Kim instead
emphasised the first dimension, advocating that South Korea should
become ’a first-rate nation in the coming century’ by utilising
globalization (or segyehwa, the catch-word of the Kim
administration).5 However, Kim’s ambitious plans were to founder
in the 1997 financial crisis, which was to force a rethinking of
priorities on his successor, Kim Dae-jung.
It is against this background that this paper will discuss South
Korea’s involvement as a so-called ‘middle power’ in
‘regionalization’ and regionalism’ in the Asian Pacific over the past
decade or so. Definitions of these three terms remain contested.
There is no commonly accepted definition of a ‘middle power’. 6
Components of both ‘hard power’ such as military power (defence
self-sufficiency) or ‘soft power’ (creative diplomatic potential) must
be considered. After his own review of the literature, Korean scholar
Joo Jae Woo has suggested, in the South Korean context, a number
of characteristics that might be considered: economic achievement,
recognition as a democratic state, respected foreign policy with
strong regional orientation, international leadership. 7 However, a
state can be considered a middle power without being a democracy.
5
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More important is whether a state can assert itself in its immediate
environment in such a way that it is considered an important player
by neighbouring countries. In that context, a significant but not
overwhelming degree of military power as well as economic and
diplomatic power can be considered relevant. It should be noted the
term ‘middle power’ is preferred to that of a ‘semi-periphery’ state, a
concept much analysed by dependency and world systems theorists
such as Immanuel Wallerstein, because the latter term has almost
exclusively an economic meaning within the global capitalist
system, whereas the discussion here is about South Korean power
not just in its economic dimension, but also in its diplomatic,
military and even cultural dimensions.
The distinctions between regionalization and regionalism are often
vague,8 but, for the purposes of this paper, a broad conceptualisation
is adopted, with regionalization referring to the process of
interaction within a region and regionalism to the tendency to create
institutions or at least mechanisms to assist in that interaction. While
appreciating that it is difficult to separate the two concepts, this
paper will first briefly discuss South Korea’s involvement in
regionalization and then focus on its role in the emerging Asian
regionalism.
South Korea’s Links with the Region
South Korea’s economic linkages with the Asian Pacific region,
particularly the resource-rich countries of South-east Asia, had
grown considerably as Korean industrialisation continued apace
from the 1960s. South Korea’s lack of natural resources meant a
reliance on overseas sources of raw materials. While most of the
energy sources came from the Middle East (at least until some
diversification, including sourcing from Indonesia and Brunei, since
the 1980s), the Asian Pacific region did supply other vital raw
materials and also intermediate products. By 1997 around 10% of
8
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Korean imports came from the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries; by adding in Japan, China and Taiwan
around 40% of all imports came from the Asian Pacific, compared to
around 35% in 1980.9 Similarly the importance of the Asian Pacific
region as an export market for South Korean manufactures had also
grown, if anything more significantly. In 1980, Japan, China,
Taiwan and ASEAN collectively accounted for around 29% of total
South Korean exports, but by 1997 this had risen to 47%. After
fluctuations caused by the Asian financial crisis, the above Asian
states accounted for almost exactly 50% of all South Korean exports
and 48% of imports in 2004; clearly China was a significant factor in
this situation, having overtaken first Japan and then the United
States to become by that year South Korea’s largest trading partner.
Korean companies also increased their investment in the region from
the mid-1980s, as outward foreign direct investment (FDI) began to
be actively state-supported. By 1997 44% of Korea’s cumulative
outward FDI went to Asia, compared to only 31% in the 1968-80
period. Outward Korean FDI went through fluctuations after the
Asian financial crisis, as companies reassessed their priorities. In
particular, China became increasingly attractive to Korean firms, and
the flows increased so rapidly that, taking cumulative totals of FDI
from 1968-November 2005 (on an arrival basis), South Korean FDI
into China exceeded that of the combined flows to the other 9 Asian
destinations and was almost equal to South Korean FDI into the
United States, long the leading destination for such FDI.10
South Korea had long had a restrictive attitude towards inward FDI,
but since its OECD accession and most significantly after the Asian
financial crisis active inward investment promotion has become a
feature of policy-making. 11 Most inward FDI has come from the
United States and Europe, but from the Asian Pacific region Japan
has remained an important source of FDI with around 15% of all
9
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inward FDI in cumulative terms, with Singapore, Taiwan and Hong
Kong and more recently China also investing (Chinese FDI into
South Korea rose dramatically in 2004 from very low levels to over
US$1 billion).
South Korea has, of course, another significant linkage with the
Asian Pacific region, culturally, through what is now well-known as
the “Korean wave’ (hallyu). Originating with popular music,
passing through TV soap operas and films, it has become a
phenomenon embracing Korean culture in a much broader sense,
including Korean food, customs and even traditional clothing.12 The
Korean wave has proved to be not just an economic boost (in 2005
Korean cultural products exports were worth around US$1 billion,
most of them to the Asian Pacific region), but also, as Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon has argued, a means to bring South Korea
long-overdue respect. 13 In the process, according to one cultural
policy official, South Korea has ‘changed from a receiver to a
transmitter of culture’.14
APEC and Regional Aspirations
Although, as noted above, South Korea’s economic linkages with
the Asian Pacific region had been growing and it had been the
principal sponsor of ASPAC in the late 1960s, South Korea had
played a rather low-key role in the subsequent development of
regional cooperation concepts and organisations. A proposal by
President Chun Doo Hwan, in 1982, for a summit of regional leaders
received nothing more than polite but non-committal responses, so
South Korea had to content itself with participation in businessrelated regional organisations, such as the Pacific Basin Economic
Council. This relatively passive approach was to change when
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke used his visit to Seoul in
12
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early 1989 to launch his proposal for an Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum. While drawing on earlier regional
initiatives and organisations, APEC marked a qualitative shift in the
level of official involvement, as it was intended to be the first ever
region-wide inter-governmental organisation.
South Korea proved enthusiastic, assisting the Australians in
lobbying for its realisation and becoming one of the 11 countries to
attend the founding ministerial meeting of APEC later that same
year. Apart from fitting in with the perceived need to gradually
diversify external links while keeping the US connection, APEC
had, according to Chung Lee and Charles Morrison, three other
benefits for South Korea. 15 Firstly, it helped to accord political
legitimacy to South Korea. Secondly, it allowed South Korea to
develop ties with China, for South Korean officials adroitly
negotiated with the Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong
governments to ensure that all three were able to join APEC at the
Seoul ministerial meeting in 1991 (South Korea and China finally
recognised each other in 1992). Thirdly, South Korea believed that it
could gain bargaining leverage in its negotiations with its larger
trading partners through association with other medium-sized or
smaller nations.
In the early years of APEC’s existence, South Korea found little
difficulty in following the general trend, which was for setting up
general principles and more talk than action. However, in 1993
APEC entered a second phase in its development; under the impetus
of the United States, which was the lead country that year, the level
of governmental representation was raised with the first ever summit
meeting of leaders (a practice that has now become the norm) and
more concerted efforts were made to transform the organisation into
a more powerful force for trade and investment liberalisation. 16
15
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16
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South Korea moved from an attitude of enthusiasm to a more mixed
one. The Koreans had little difficulty either with the summit idea as
it gave yet another opportunity for Kim Young-sam to meet foreign
leaders or with APEC being utilised as a ‘weapon’ with which to
beat the Europeans into coming to a deal on the long-winded GATT
talks, but they were less sure of the implications of the full-blooded
liberalisation targets which were implied by the declarations which
came out of the 1994, 1995 and 1996 APEC meetings.
Although the APEC vision of trade liberalisation fitted in with the
gradual trend in that direction which the South Korean economy was
taking anyway, South Korea also had special reservations about its
highly-protected rice market, the peculiar nature of its specific bans
on a large number of Japanese products, its general resistance to
foreign investment and its fears that its own market might be flooded
by lower-cost manufactures from China and South-east Asia. 17
However, as was to become clear in the subsequent years, South
Korea was not alone in being cautious about embracing the US-style
liberalisation agenda for APEC; indeed it was far from being the
most worried member country. The APEC liberalisation target plans
were split into two categories, with the year 2010 as the completion
date for advanced countries and 2020 for developing countries.
Since South Korea was on the verge of achieving OECD
membership, its claims that it should have the later deadline were
not convincing and it was placed into the ‘advanced’ category.
However, the Asian financial crisis and South Korea’s own
particular troubles were to make the Koreans more disillusioned with
APEC, in what can be described as the third phase of APEC’s
development, a stage in which the organisation seemed to be losing
its way. Kim Young-sam had already committed himself to attend
the Vancouver APEC meeting in November 1997 when the crisis hit
South Korea. Even within his administration, opinions differed about
whether he should attend in those circumstances, but he decided to
go anyway and use the opportunity to appeal to the member
countries for assistance. His appeals, however, largely fell on deaf
ears. The other APEC leaders listened sympathetically, but did little
17
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else other than offer words of ‘moral support’. Kim returned home
disappointed, faced with no alternative but to do a deal with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Of course, South Korea’s case
was not the only one for APEC to face in 1997; it proved singularly
inept at offering collectively anything much to help other suffering
members either.18
When Kim Dae-jung subsequently attended the next few APEC
summits, he used these opportunities to stress that the South Korean
economy had switched to becoming genuinely open, for he saw
foreign investment as a crucial part of his recovery plans. But having
whole-heartedly joined the group of countries strongly favouring
liberalisation, he found that this group was if anything in an even
smaller minority within APEC as many members clearly saw the
Asian financial crisis as evidence of the dangers of excessive
openness. For Kim, the APEC meetings therefore served more as a
means to hold bilateral meetings with leaders of key partners than as
a forum that would bring substantial and speedy benefit to the
Korean economy. Some Korean scholars argued that South Korea’s
level of economic development and its overall economic size put it
in the ’middle’ of APEC, with the consequent potential to ‘mediate’
the North-South economic relationship within APEC. 19 However,
the financial crisis, by undermining the country’s credibility, wiped
out any immediate possibility of South Korea playing that kind of
role within APEC.
The 9-11 events in the United States inevitably impacted on APEC,
which has subsequently entered what might be considered its fourth
phase, one in which the slow process on economic cooperation has
been overshadowed by more political and security-related issues,
such as the war on terrorism, coming onto the agenda of annual
meetings. Some countries, led by the United States, have
consequently wished to utilise the APEC meetings to discuss
policies with a more political dimension, while others have resisted,
18
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arguing that APEC should continue to focus on its original economic
role. Under the new Roh Moo-Hyun administration, South Korea did
not take a strong position in this debate. The high-point of South
Korean involvement, the hosting of the 2005 APEC Summit in
Busan, therefore reflected a Korean attempt to balance between the
two viewpoints. As a result, under Korean direction, the APEC
meetings in Busan concentrated on three themes: reviving the stalled
WTO trade negotiations, combating terrorism and preparing against
an avian influenza pandemic.
ARF and ASEAN+3
In the 1990s, South Korea became involved in two other regional
groupings apart from APEC, which also not only marked recognition
of the country’s international status but also provided avenues for
diversification: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the informal
ASEAN + 3 leaders’ meetings. The end of the Cold War had
provoked a debate in the Asia Pacific region about the future
‘security architecture’ of the region. Echoing in a lesser key the
much more intense European debate, Asian Pacific regional policymakers and an active ‘second-track’ academic network discussed
alternatives. Rejecting models too closely drawn from the European
experience, the initially reluctant ASEAN decided to build on its
existing external dialogue arrangements to create the ASEAN
Regional Forum, which met for the first time in 1994.20 It started
with 17 members, including South Korea, but has now expanded to
25 members, including North Korea. Its annual meetings, and its
expanding number of working-level sessions in between, have
tended to move at a pace which is comfortable for the most cautious
members - China and some of the ASEAN members - but its
significance lay in it being the first ever such organisation to bring
so many regional states around the same table to discuss security
issues.
Although the focus has tended to be more on South-east Asianrelated issues, South Korea has been able to raise Korean issues
20
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Forum, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).
10

from time to time. Nonetheless, it is true that even at the July 1994
meeting, when the ‘nuclear crisis’ on the Korean peninsula was at a
crucial stage, ARF did not take a concerted position that would be of
real value to South Korea. Successive chairman’s concluding
statements made at the annual ARF meetings tended to be limited to
rather anodyne expressions about the ’importance of peace and
security on the Korean peninsula’, the need for dialogue, support for
the activities of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organisation (KEDO) and, since the eruption of the second ‘nuclear
crisis’, calls for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.21 At the time of
ARF’s formation, North Korea did approach ASEAN to enquire
about membership, but it was told that until it had shown better
behaviour over nuclear site inspections, it would not be considered.22
Subsequently, some ARF members felt that ‘its participation should
be a reward for conducting better relations with South Korea’. 23
Under Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’, however, the South was
more positive to the idea of North Korea joining ARF and with other
states in the region noting the North’s diplomatic offensive in early
2000 and the planned North-South summit, it was decided to allow
the North to join with effect from the July 2000 ARF meeting in
Bangkok, which it duly did. However, with ASEAN continuing to
insist on its diplomatic centrality within ARF, the organisation has
continued to devote relatively little time to considering North-east
Asian security issues. However, the annual ARF meetings have at
least provided opportunities for private bilateral meetings in the
margins between the North Korean Foreign Minister and, at different
times, his counterparts from the South, Japan and the United
States.24
Of more utility to the South Korean government in terms of the
prestige attached, however, has been its participation in a new
21
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informal format, called the ASEAN+3 summits, which have been
held annually since late 1997. This new format is an evolution out of
the concept for an ‘East Asian Economic Group’, soon modified to
the name ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ (EAEC), put forward by
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad in 1990.
Designed as a counter-balance to the Australian-proposed APEC,
EAEC would exclude both the North American and the Australasian
states. South Korea was one of the intended participants, but, well
aware that the Americans were strongly against the concept (the US
Secretary of State James Baker actually used the 1991 APEC
meeting in Seoul as venue for strongly lobbying against it), the
South Koreans were non-committal.25 With other ASEAN members
lukewarm, the concept remained quiescent, until fortuitously the
creation of a new inter-regional dialogue grouping with Europe in
1996 - the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) - resulted in an Asian
participation that strongly resembled those countries originally
envisaged as EAEC participants. Emboldened by this precedent, and
drawing on Asian defensiveness against the West as the Asian
financial crisis took its toll, Mahathir succeeded in persuading his
ASEAN colleagues that the planned 1997 Summit of ASEAN
leaders, designed to consolidate the organisation in the face of new
membership and economic challenges, should hold a separate
meeting to which the Japanese, Chinese and South Korean leaders
should be invited. The Japanese prime minister had been invited to a
previous ASEAN summit, in 1987, but it was the first occasion for
China and South Korea to be so invited.
With Kim Young-sam caught up in the IMF negotiations and the
presidential elections, Prime Minister Koh Kun represented South
Korea in the December 1997 summit. President Kim Dae-jung
attended subsequent annual meetings and President Roh Moo-hyun
has continued this practice. The December 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit
in Manila was memorable for some lofty rhetoric from the
Philippines’ President Joseph Estrada about moving to ‘an East
Asian common market…..one East Asian community’ and on a
more practical level an agreement to strengthen trade and investment
25
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and information technology cooperation.26 However, also important
for Kim in 1999 was the first ever three-way summit talks with the
Japanese prime minister and Chinese premier, after the initially
cautious Chinese agreed to join in. Sensitive security issues were
avoided, but economic and environmental issues were covered
during the breakfast talks. 27 These informal three-way summit
meetings have continued to be held by their successors every year,
except for 2005, when the tense state of Sino-Japanese relations led
to the Chinese cancelling the meeting.
It is tempting to argue that despite its financial crisis, South Korea
was still considered important enough to be invited as an equal
participant with China and Japan. A more cynical approach would be
to say that, since the peculiar political status of Taiwan and Hong
Kong excluded them, there were no real alternatives if the ASEAN
hosts wanted to include any other countries to balance the two giants
of Japan and China. A more charitable analysis might be to argue
that, paradoxically, it was because of South Korea’s - and Asia’s
financial collapse – that this opportunity presented itself. One of the
net effects of the Asian financial crisis was to increase interest in
East Asian, as opposed to Pacific-wide, regionalism. South Korean
participation in this as yet informal arrangement of ASEAN+3,
coming at a time indeed when the country was at one of its lowest
ebbs in economic terms, did prove a welcome boost to Kim Daejung’s diplomacy. In this sense, then, South Korea’s regional status
was not diminished markedly by the Asian financial crisis.
There was one further related regional initiative that posed special
questions for South Korea, namely, the idea of creating an Asian
Monetary Fund (AMF) or similar form of regional ‘self-help’
financial organisation which was not dominated by the Western
powers. Japan had originally floated the idea of setting up a $100
billion Asian fund in September 1997, but it had been dropped after
strong opposition from the United States, which clearly was worried
about undermining the IMF. The Kim Young-sam government had
initially supported the Japanese proposal, but after it had to turn to
26
27

South China Morning Post, 29 November 1999.
Ibid.
13

the IMF for assistance its attitude cooled. The Kim Dae-jung
administration, wedded to the IMF package, had not pursued the
idea further. Indeed, while the new government did join in the calls
for a new international financial architecture, it also made it clear
that one of the objectives should be for ‘the IMF and the World
Bank’s role in both managing and preventing crises should be
strengthened’ and argued that any regional cooperative scheme
would ‘require a more long-term approach’.28 This rather ambivalent
attitude continued to be a feature of the Korean approach to the
subsequent intermittent and rather fruitless discussions on regional
cooperative financing arrangements.29 Nevertheless, South Korea did
subsequently agree to participate in the so-called Chiang Mai
Initiative, a currency swap mechanism created in May 2000.
However, as gradually the ASEAN+3 process became more
institutionalised as a consultation mechanism, South Korea became
more active, in two respects. Firstly, it has come to be seen by the
AEAN states as, on occasions, playing a useful balancing role
between the two economic giants of China and Japan. For example,
it was former South Korean foreign minister, Han Sung-joo, who
was asked to chair the Asian Vision Group, which was established at
Kim Dae-jung’s initiative and which finally in 2001 set out ideas
about the prospects of the ASEAN+3 process, including the
possibility of eventually forming some kind of East Asian
community. 30 Secondly, it helped to coordinate research and
collaborative policy ideas amongst the three Northeast Asian
members, such as in environmental, trade and financial
cooperation.31 These discussions may, in turn, have helped to feed
into President Roh’s concept of positioning South Korea as a
regional business hub for North-east Asia.
28
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Nationalism, Regionalism, Globalization and a ‘Middle Power’
South Korean presidents do like to leave their mark on the country,
not least by developing particular visions – or political hallmarks –
for their administrations. As mentioned earlier, the desire to improve
South Korea’s international status during the Kim Young-sam
administration was to become increasingly intertwined with his
concept of segyehwa (globalization). Kim’s attendance at the APEC
Summit in Indonesia in November 1994 convinced him that South
Korea really needed to add some substance to its role if it was be a
fully-rated player in the Asian Pacific and beyond. 32 The term
segyehwa, however, seemed to mean different things to different
people. For some, it meant liberalisation and de-regulation of the
economy. For others, it implied a more thorough-going renovation
of the whole socio-economic system of Korea, encouraging
‘political, cultural and social open-mindedness’. 33 Although Kim
achieved some partial successes, the complexities of this process
were to be exposed as the economy moved towards collapse in 1997
and the term segyehwa slowly dropped out of official usage.
Anyway, whether APEC-inspired or not, under Kim Young-sam it
did not imply any special priority being given to the Asian Pacific
region, but rather a more general openness to the world.
Faced with the priority of restoring confidence after the financial
crisis, Kim Dae-jung launched an ambitious ‘second nationbuilding’ campaign in August 1998, which did include as one of its
themes ‘open globalism’, later redefined in external economic policy
terms into making South Korea an ‘open trading nation’. Although
Kim was willing to pursue liberalization and openness as a means to
restore economic health, he did not set out improving links with the
Asian neighbours as a special focus. Nevertheless, it was during Kim
Dae-jung’s period in office that the ASEAN+3 process began to take
off and also that South Korea made its first tentative steps towards
promoting free trade agreements (FTAs) with important regional
trading partners by opening negotiations with Chile. The logic
behind this venture into FTAs was that ‘an expansion of free trade
32
33

Information from a member of Kim Young-sam’s staff, March 1995.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995.
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within regional blocs would ultimately complement Korea’s trade
interests’.34
Bradley Babson has argued that President Roh’s administration ‘has
embraced the idea of regionalism as a major policy direction’ for
South Korea.35 However, this judgement has to be qualified, in that
Roh seems to have been focusing very much on North-east Asia
rather than the wider Asian Pacific region. Indeed, Joo has argued
that Roh’s foreign policy initially had only one aim: ‘to realize [a]
peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asian age’ through South Korea
acting as the ‘Northeast Asian Hub’, facilitated by ‘balanced
pragmatic diplomacy’. 36 The prolonged second North Korean
nuclear crisis, however, has proved a distraction for Roh’s policymaking and it seems that not only has the ‘hub’ concept lost some
momentum but also, as Joo argues, ‘the government has yet to come
up with an innovative idea to link itself further and deeper with the
development of East Asian regionalism’.37
Nevertheless, while maybe not an innovative leader, South Korea
has continued to be actively involved in regional meetings. Indeed,
in December 2005 Roh spent nearly one week in Malaysia, probably
his longest stay in any foreign country during his tenure in office, as
he attended three regional multilateral meetings: ASEAN+3,
ASEAN+1 (Korea) and the inaugural East Asian Summit (EAS).
South Korea had been lagging behind both China and Japan in
approaching ASEAN for FTA-style arrangements (and undoubtedly
feeling some pressure as a result),38 but formal negotiations began in
early 2005 and a basic agreement was reached in Kuala Lumpur in
December 2005 on an ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA),
34
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with plans to resolve remaining differences, especially over services
and investments, during further negotiations during 2006. 39
Important for the future direction of the region was the EAS, at
which India, Australia and New Zealand joined the ASEAN+3
countries. The diversity – and controversial nature - of the
membership of this new grouping (which might better be expressed
as 10+3+3) means that, although the participating leaders agreed on
establishing the EAS as a ‘forum for dialogue on broad strategic,
political and economic issues of common interest and concern’,
there remains considerable ambiguity over its role and future
direction.40 ASEAN clearly wishes to be the driver of this new forum
and with China and Japan jostling to influence its membership,
South Korea is unlikely to be presented with any opportunities to be
a leader.
Traditionally Korea had always been aware of its vulnerability to the
two neighbouring giants of China and Japan, and it has both
benefited from and suffered from its geographical location
sandwiched between them. Modern Korean nationalism, initially
developed as an ideology to fight against Western encroachments in
the nineteenth century and Japanese colonialism in the twentieth
century, became utilised by both North and South as a means to
rationalise their respective desires for unification. Such nationalist
feelings continued consistently in the postwar period to find
expression in the South against Japan, even though at times there
was both conscious and unconscious borrowing from Japan, and in a
more fluctuating manner against the United States, as bouts of antiAmericanism alternated with a desire to utilise US capitalist and
military strength. This meant that South Korean concepts of
‘international’ or ‘global’ or even, it has to be said, ‘Asia’ were
conditioned heavily by the nature of the two relationships with the
dominating forces of Japan and the United States. In the past decade
or so, of course, China has very firmly come into the equation as far
as South Korean perceptions of the region and the outside world are
39
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concerned. But the rise of China has done little to alter either the
South Korean preoccupation with North-east Asia, as opposed to the
broader Asian Pacific region, or, as Chae-jin Lee has argued, the
South Koreans’ instinctive fear of ‘foreign domination and big
power diplomacy’.41
Against this background, what kind of role can a so-called ‘middle
power’ such as South Korea play in the region? According to Joo’s
analysis, South Korea has fulfilled sufficient criteria – such as
economic power, democratic status, and membership of regional and
international organisations – to qualify as a ‘middle power’. South
Korea has become and, despite its hiccups over the financial crisis,
has remained one of the world’s top ten trading nations, with a per
capita national income higher than many European states. While
observers may argue over the extent of democratic consolidation,
South Korea is clearly a democracy, even though, as has been argued
earlier, this is not a necessary condition for qualification as a middle
power. As discussed in this paper, it is also a member of all the
important international and regional organisations. To this can be
added the significant level of modernised military power, with
increasing projection capabilities, now available to Korean
presidents. While South Korea may appear ‘small’ by comparison
with its immediate neighbours, China, Japan and Russia, in the
wider international context it does meet the broad criteria of being a
middle power.
Yet, South Korea seems to be held back from ‘fully practicing
middle power diplomacy or displaying middle power leadership’.42
Joo suggests four reasons for this failure to meet expectations. Three
of them can perhaps be combined into one, namely, that the
capabilities, power and rivalry between China and Japan are too
overwhelming for South Korea. The other reason is the handicap
derived from the priority given to national security (such as the two
nuclear crises and the current missile crisis). 43 Clearly, these do
41
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represent very real influences, but, at the same time, they may have
helped to nurture mind-sets in Korean policy-makers that inhibit
them from fully appreciating the utility of broader regionalism and
the desirability of trying to set out their own vision of regional order.
The end of the Cold War and the later Asian financial crisis brought
intense debate about the nature of regional order, but without any
definite conclusion: American hegemony, an Asian concert of
power, multilateral security cooperation regimes, Chinese-style
‘harmonious’ co-existence have all been advocated and discussed.44
Yet, South Korean leaders and officials have not been in the
forefront of the debate and it is still unclear what is their ideal
conception of broader regional order.
Globalization, for good or ill, is a process which countries and
peoples find difficult to resist. In relation to globalization, some
countries have seen regionalism as a counter (even a ‘stumbling
bloc’), while others have seen regionalism as a ‘building bloc’.
While the jury is still out on such questions, there is little doubt that
the trends towards regionalism are only going to be reinforced.
South Korea does need to cultivate a more cosmopolitan outlook that
would enable it to be more proactive and engaged in the wider Asian
Pacific region. A more active regional profile by South Korea would
undoubtedly be welcomed by the countries of South-east Asia,
which remain wary of becoming over-dependent on the major
regional powers of China and Japan.45 If the ‘Korean wave’ has done
much to change attitudes and perceptions of Korea amongst peoples,
companies and even governments around the Asian Pacific region,
then surely Korea too needs to reciprocate, by reaching out to and
understanding better the wider region in which it is situated.
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